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People often overestimate probabilities of conjunctive events. The authors explored
whether the accuracy of conjunctive probability estimates can be improved by increased
experience with relevant constituent events and by using memory aids. The first experi-
ment showed that increased experience with constituent events increased the correlation
between the estimated and the objective conjunctive probabilities, but that it did not
reduce overestimation of conjunctive probabilities. The second experiment showed that
reducing cognitive load with memory aids for the constituent probabilities led to improved
estimates of the conjunctive probabilities and to decreased overestimation of conjunctive
probabilities.To explain the cognitive process underlying people’s probability estimates, the
configural weighted average model was tested against the normative multiplicative model.
The configural weighted average model generates conjunctive probabilities that systemati-
cally overestimate objective probabilities although the generated probabilities still correlate
strongly with the objective probabilities. For the majority of participants this model was bet-
ter than the multiplicative model in predicting the probability estimates. However, when
memory aids were provided, the predictive accuracy of the multiplicative model increased.
In sum, memory tools can improve people’s conjunctive probability estimates.
Keywords: judgment, accuracy, conjunctive probability, overestimation, conjunction fallacy, configural weighted
average hypothesis
EXPLORING THE OVERESTIMATION OF CONJUNCTIVE
PROBABILITIES
Over the last decades, hundreds of studies have explored people’s
ability to estimate conjunctive probabilities (Wedell and Moro,
2008). This vast literature teaches us that if a group of people are
shown a description of a woman who resembles the prototypical
feminist and are then asked to estimate the probability that this
woman is a bank teller and the probability that she is a feminist
bank teller, the modal response is likely to be that the latter prob-
ability is higher than the former (a phenomenon known as the
conjunction error; Tversky and Kahneman, 1983). The literature
also teaches us that the conjunction error can be observed in a wide
range of populations and with a wide range of tasks (e.g., Crandall
and Greenfield, 1986; Davidson, 1995; Hertwig and Chase, 1998;
Wedell and Moro, 2008; Nilsson et al., 2009). Oddly, there is one
aspect about which the literature is silent: it tells us nothing about
how well conjunctive probability estimates generated by humans
correspond to conjunctive probabilities in the environment. Thus,
in some sense, the literature tells us nothing about people’s ability
to estimate accurate conjunctive probabilities.
We explored the accuracy of conjunctive probability estimates
and factors that can potentially affect this accuracy. As emphasized
by Hammond (1996; see also Dunwoody, 2009), the accuracy of a
judgment, such as a probability judgment, can be evaluated in at
least two ways: by whether it corresponds with facts about the envi-
ronment (the correspondence criterion) or by whether it coheres
with standards set by normative theories (the coherence criterion).
A problematic aspect of previous literature on the accuracy of
conjunctive probability estimates is that almost all attention has
been devoted to the coherence criterion. We fear that this dis-
proportionate focus might have led to an overly negative view of
people’s ability to estimate conjunctive probabilities. Therefore, to
get a more complete picture of people’s ability to estimate accurate
conjunctive probabilities, we conducted two experiments where
we focused on both coherence and correspondence. The paper
begins with a discussion of what a probability is and how its accu-
racy can be measured. This discussion is followed by a review of
the literature on conjunctive probability estimation, which leads
into the presentation of the two experiments.
What is a probability? In this article, we adopt the frequen-
tist interpretation of the term probability (see Hacking, 1975),
according to which probabilities can be assessed fairly accurately
by observing the occurrence of events in the environment. For
example, imagine two boxes, A and B, both filled with marbles
that are either black or white. The distribution of marbles in these
boxes can be estimated by repeatedly sampling from both boxes.
The probability of, for example, sampling a black marble from
Box A can then be estimated from the frequency of black mar-
bles sampled from Box A. Suppose Box A contains 50% black
and 50% white marbles, whereas Box B contains 80% black and
20% white marbles. In this case, the constituent probability of
sampling a black marble in a single draw equals 0.50 for A and
0.80 for B. To assess the probability of conjunctively sampling
a black marble out of Box A and a black marble out of Box
B, probability theory prescribes multiplying the two constituent
probabilities:
p (A&B) = p (A)× p (B) (1)
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This multiplicative rule holds whenever the two constituents
are independent, as in the experiments presented below. Thus,
when drawing one marble from Box A and one from Box B, the
probability of sampling two black marbles is 0.50× 0.80= 0.40.
In the following we frequently refer to the term objective prob-
ability, which is a probability computed with perfect knowledge
of the environment and, in the case of conjunctive probabilities,
according to Eq. 1.
What determines the accuracy of a probability estimate?
According to the correspondence criterion, a probability estimate
is accurate if it coincides with the corresponding objective prob-
ability. We evaluated this type of accuracy with the root mean
squared error (RMSE), the mean error (ME), and the correlation
(r) between estimated and objective probabilities. The difference
between r and the other two measures is that whereas RMSE
and ME measure the numerical difference between estimated and
objective probabilities, r measures how good participants are at
rank ordering a set of conjunctive probabilities. The difference
between RMSE and ME is that RMSE captures magnitude of
deviation, whereas ME captures systematic bias.
According to the coherence criterion, a probability estimate is
accurate if it coheres with the laws of probability theory. From the
conjunction rule defined in Eq. 1 it follows that
p (A) ≥ p (A&B) (2a)
and
p (B) ≥ p (A&B) (2b)
The rule defined in Eqs 2a and 2b is known as the conjunction
rule. A violation of the conjunction rule is known as a conjunction
error. Here, we measured the coherence of conjunctive probability
estimates by the prevalence of conjunction errors.
The vast majority of previous research on the estimation of
conjunctive probabilities has focused on the coherence criterion
(most often on whether estimated probabilities cohere with the
conjunction rule). In an early study investigating constituent and
conjunctive probability estimates, Wyer (1976) presented people
with statements such as “persons rarely have Attribute A” and
“persons usually have Attribute B” and asked them to estimate
the probabilities that someone would have Attribute A [p(A)],
Attribute B[p(B)], and both attributes [p(A&B)]. He predicted
participants’ estimates of p(A&B) by multiplying their estimates
of p(A) and p(B), as prescribed by probability theory (Eq. 1).
The finding was that estimated probabilities of p(A&B) corre-
lated very strongly with the predicted probabilities, although they
were systematically higher. In other words, given participants’ esti-
mated constituent probabilities, the conjunctive probabilities were
overestimated (for a more recent study with similar design and
related results, see Khemlani et al., 2012). Note that because Wyer
(1976) compared estimates against probabilities generated by Eq.
1, and not against probabilities retrieved from the environment,
this study concerned the coherence criterion. Although little is
known about the robustness of Wyer’s (1976) first finding, hun-
dreds of studies have replicated the finding of overestimation (e.g.,
Tversky and Kahneman, 1983; Wedell and Moro, 2008). Most of
these have focused on the conjunction error, a phenomenon that
has been argued to be a direct result of people’s overestimation
of conjunctive probabilities (Nilsson et al., 2009). The conjunc-
tion error is one of the most frequently observed phenomena in
research on judgment and decision making. It has been observed
in a range of populations and tasks and it has been shown to
be almost impossible to eliminate (for an extended review of the
literature, see Wedell and Moro, 2008).
We know of no study that has focused solely on the correspon-
dence of conjunctive probability estimates. There are, however,
some studies which have touched the topic (e.g., Gavanski and
Roskos-Ewoldsen, 1991; Juslin et al., 2011). These studies have
typically used a task where participants first are told the val-
ues of two constituent probabilities and where they then are
asked to assess the corresponding conjunctive probability. The
common finding is that conjunctive probabilities tend to be
overestimated.
Evidence suggests that it is the rule that people use to com-
bine p(A) and p(B) into p(A&B) that leads them to overestimate
conjunctive probabilities (Gavanski and Roskos-Ewoldsen, 1991).
The exact properties of this combination rule are still debated but
one idea that has received substantial empirical support is that
people estimate the conjunctive probability by taking a configural
weighted average of p(A) and p(B) (Fantino et al., 1997; Nils-
son et al., 2009; Nilsson and Andersson, 2010; Jenny et al., under
review; but for alternative suggestions, see, Wyer, 1976; Einhorn,
1985; Abelson et al., 1987). According to the configural weighted
average model,
p (A&B) = β× p (A)+ (1− β)× p (B) , (3)
when p(A)< p(B) and where β is a free weighting parameter
(with 0.5≤ β≤ 1; Nilsson et al., 2009). As its predicted conjunc-
tive probabilities can never be lower than p(A), the configural
weighted average model predicts conjunction errors, and thus sys-
tematic overestimation of conjunctive probabilities. The bound on
β ensures that the lower constituent probability receives relatively
more weight, which results in predictions that correlate strongly
with objective conjunctive probabilities computed according to
the multiplicative model (Eq. 1). Hence, as shown by Juslin
et al. (2009), the configural weighted average model predicts both
findings reported by Wyer (1976).
EXPERIMENT 1
When people are exposed to environment x and asked to estimate
the probability of observing Event A in environment x, high corre-
spondences between the estimates and the objective probabilities
have been found (Peterson and Beach, 1967). Furthermore, when
experience with environment x is increased, the accuracy of peo-
ple’s estimates of the probability that A occurs in environment x
tends to increase (Beach et al., 1970). In Experiment 1, we tested
whether increased experience with Events A and B also improves
the accuracy of people’s estimates of p(A&B). Accuracy was eval-
uated with three measures related to the correspondence criterion
(RMSE, ME, and r) and one measure related to the coherence
criterion (the proportion of conjunction errors). In addition, to
explore the psychological process underlying people’s conjunctive
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probability judgments, the weighted average model (Eq. 3) and the
multiplicative model (Eq. 1) were used to predict the probability
estimates at an individual level.
To our knowledge, the design used in Experiment 1 is unique
in two important ways. (1) It is the first study where the accuracy
of conjunctive probability estimates is studied in a task where the
participants have to learn all task-relevant information. (2) It is the
first study where both the numerical difference and the correla-
tion between estimated and objective conjunctive probabilities are
measured (please note that Wyer, 1976, did not compare against
objective probabilities).
MATERIAL AND METHODS
Participants
Twenty-nine undergraduate students, 3 male and 26 female
(M age= 22.3 years), from the University of Basel volunteered to
take part in the study. Most participants were psychology students
who had completed at least one course in statistics. Hence, most
participants had at least an elementary understanding of the basic
concepts in statistics. Participants were compensated with either
course credit or CHF 10 per half hour. In addition, participants
had the opportunity to earn a bonus (described below).
Materials
On a computer screen, participants were presented with a black,
a green, a blue, a red, and a yellow box. Each of the five boxes
contained a proportion of x solid marbles (marbles of the same
color as the box) and 1 – x striped marbles (white marbles with a
colored stripe down the middle). The proportion of solid marbles
(x) varied among the boxes (0.95, 0.80, 0.20, 0.50, and 0.95 for the
black, green, blue, red, and yellow box, respectively). All five boxes
were visible on the screen throughout the entire experiment. The
positions of the boxes were randomly assigned to the participants.
Design and procedure
The experiment was a 2× 2 within-subject design with level of
experience (low vs. high) and event type (constituent vs. conjunc-
tive) as independent variables. The experiment took about 1 h
to finish and was divided into two blocks. Each block consisted
of an experience phase and an estimation phase. In the experi-
ence phase, participants learned about the proportion of solid and
striped marbles in each box by sampling. In the estimation phase
the participants were asked to give constituent and conjunctive
probability judgments.
In the beginning of the experience phase, a red arrow appeared
above the (color) box. Then the participants were told, “Ten mar-
bles will be sampled from the (color) box” and asked, “How many
do you think will be solid?” Participants answered by clicking on
one of 11 buttons labeled 0–10. Then 10 marbles were sampled
from the box, one at a time. Each marble was shown above the
box for 1 s and there was a 500 ms break between the presen-
tations of the marbles. Finally, participants were informed that
“you predicted x” and “y solid marbles were sampled.” This sam-
pling procedure was repeated once more. After the participants had
experienced two samples of 10 marbles each, they were told, “The
(color) box includes 100 marbles,” and were asked, “What propor-
tion of these do you think are solid?” Participants responded by
typing in a value between 0 and 100. This question was asked to
ensure that participants remained focused throughout the whole
experience phase. These steps were repeated for all five boxes going
through the boxes from left to right. After that, the whole sampling
procedure was repeated. Thus, during the experience phase par-
ticipants experienced four samples with 10 marbles each per box.
The samples were constrained such that the proportions of solid
marbles sampled from the (color) box in each experience phase
perfectly corresponded to the proportion of solid marbles in the
(color) box. That is, in each experience phase 38, 38, 32, 20, and 8
solid marbles were sampled from the black, yellow, green, red, and
blue boxes, respectively. Hence, even at the very outset, participants
had been provided with the necessary information to estimate
perfectly the objective probability of sampling a colored/striped
marble from each box.
After each experience phase an estimation phase of 60 trials fol-
lowed. Participants were asked to evaluate 10 constituent events
and 20 conjunctive events twice. The presentation order was semi-
random with the constraint that all 30 events were presented once
before any event was presented a second time. On constituent event
trials, participants were told, “One marble will be sampled from
the [color] box. Assess the probability that it is [striped/solid].” On
conjunctive event trials, participants were told, “Two marbles will
be sampled, one from the [Color 1] box and one from the [Color
2] box. Assess the probability that the marble from the [Color
1] box is [striped/solid] and that the marble from the [Color 2]
box is [striped/solid].” Participants responded by typing in a value
between 0 and 1.
Upon arrival, participants received a short booklet containing
instructions, which was collected at the end of the experiment. Par-
ticipants read through the whole booklet before the experimental
program was started. Besides describing the procedures of the
experience and estimation phases, the booklet explicitly informed
participants that the boxes did not contain anything other than
solid and striped marbles, that the proportion of solid marbles
differed between boxes, that the proportion of solid marbles in a
particular box was constant throughout the experiment, and that
their goal in the experience phase was to learn about the propor-
tions of solid and striped marbles. The instructions included an
introduction to the (frequentist) concept of probability. Partici-
pants were informed that “the probability that an event will occur,
such as, for example, a solid marble being drawn from the black
box, is typically described as a number between 0 and 1.” Four
examples described that “a probability of (0/0.28/0.76/1) indicates
that if marbles were sampled from the black box an infinite number
of times (none/28%/76%/all) of these would be solid.”Participants
were further told that conjunctions include“a combined outcome”
and that the task was to “assess the probability that this combined
outcome will occur.” That is, participants were explicitly told that
the task “was not to make two probability judgments.”
The instructions also included information about the payoff
structure, which was implemented to incentivize participants to
maximize the accuracy of their subjective probability estimates.
The bonus was based on a proper scoring rule, the so-called qua-
dratic scoring rule (Gneiting and Raftery, 2007). The closer par-
ticipants’ probability estimates were to the objective probabilities,
the more their probability of receiving a bonus increased.
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RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
Two participants did not proceed to the second block. Thus, the
data from Block 1 are from 29 participants but the data from Block
2 are from 27 participants. On average, participants predicted the
samples of 10 marbles would contain 7.4, 7.5, 7.1, 5.8, and 3.8 solid
marbles in Block 1 and 8.9, 8.8, 7.3, 5.2, and 3.0 solid marbles in
Block 2, for the black (0.95), yellow (0.95), green (0.80), red (0.50),
and blue (0.25) boxes, respectively (proportions of solid marbles
in parentheses). The average estimate regarding the constituent
probability of sampling a solid (striped) marble was 0.83 (0.24),
0.82 (0.27), 0.71 (0.33), 0.53 (0.49), and 0.32 (0.67) for the black,
yellow, green, red, and blue boxes, respectively. Thus, participants
appeared to be sensitive to the fact that the base rates of solid and
striped marbles differed between boxes.
The accuracy of participants’ probability estimates are sum-
marized in Table 1. For clarity, error was computed by sub-
tracting objective from estimated probability. Consequently, a
negative ME indicates underestimation whereas a positive indi-
cates overestimation. The accuracy of the constituent probability
estimates increased with growing experience in terms of r (from
0.62 to 0.79) and RMSE (from 0.27 to 0.20) but not in terms
of ME, which was already low in Block 1. Two single-sample
t tests showed that ME was significantly higher than zero in
both Block 1, t (28)= 3.765, p= 0.001, and Block 2, t (26)= 5.869,
p< 0.001. Hence, constituent probabilities were systematically
overestimated. One-tailed independent samples t tests showed
that the increase in accuracy was significant both when consid-
ering RMSE, t (54)= 2.69, p= 0.005, and when considering r,
t (54)= 1.88, p= 0.033 (one-tailed t tests will be used through-
out this paper because of the one-sided nature of the hypothesis
that experience increase accuracy). As expected, more experience
with the environment led to a general increase in the accuracy
of the constituent probability estimates. But did increased experi-
ence with constituent events affect the accuracy of the conjunctive
probability estimates?
More experience substantially increased the correlation
between the estimated and the objective conjunctive probabilities
from 0.41 to 0.62. A one-tailed independent samples t test showed
that this increase in r was significant, t (54)= 2.25, p= 0.014.
The overall deviation between estimated and objective conjunc-
tive probabilities, as measured by RMSE, decreased from Block 1
(0.30) to Block 2 (0.26), though the decrease was not statistically
significant: one-tailed, t (54)= 1.28, p= 0.103. The level of ME
was high, thereby indicating overestimation, and did not change
from Block 1 (0.18) to Block 2(0.17). Two single-sample t tests
revealed that the overestimation was significant in both Block 1,
t (28)= 8.564, p< 0.001, and Block 2, t (26)= 6.949, p< 0.001.
Thus, while increased knowledge about constituent probabilities
was accompanied by an increased correlation between conjunc-
tive probability estimates, more experience left the overestimation
of conjunctive probabilities unaffected. Notably, this is the result
that would be predicted if participants combined probabilities by
means of the configural weighted average model (Eq. 3).
The mean proportion of conjunction errors was high in
both Block 1 (0.49) and Block 2 (0.50). If conjunction errors
were mainly attributable to random fluctuations in probability
estimates (as argued by Costello, 2009), then one would expect
the proportion of conjunction errors to be correlated with the
level of consistency in conjunctive probability estimates. The cor-
relation between the proportion of conjunction errors and the
level of consistency in conjunctive probability estimates – mea-
sured by the root mean squared deviation (RMSD) between the
first and second estimates within one estimation phase – was
close to zero in both Block 1 (r =−0.002, p= 0.992) and Block
2 (r = 0.084, p= 0.677). This result provides evidence against the
random fluctuation hypothesis.
To explore the psychological process underlying people’s con-
junctive probability judgments, the weighted average model (Eq.
3) and the multiplicative model (Eq. 1) were used to predict
the probability estimates at an individual level. To equate the
flexibility of the models, we a priori fixed the weight β of the
weighted average model to 0.80. We motivate this choice from an
ecological rationality as well as an empirical perspective. First,
a weight of this magnitude maximizes the model’s ecological
validity. Computer simulations in which the weighted average
model predicted conjunctive probabilities based on noisy samples
have shown that the resulting conjunctive probabilities corre-
lated highest with the true underlying conjunctive probabilities
for β= 0.80, irrespective of the level of noise contained in the
constituents (Juslin et al., 2009). Thus, a weight of 0.80 allowed
the model to produce conjunctive probabilities that were most
adapted to the environment. Second, recent empirical evidence
suggests that a weight of this magnitude describes well how heav-
ily people weight the smaller of two constituent probabilities when
assessing conjunctive probabilities. Using a hierarchical Bayesian
parameter estimation to fit the weighted average model to peo-
ple’s behavior resulted in best fitting parameter values which
fluctuated around a value of 0.80 (Jenny et al., under review).
Table 1 | Accuracy of participants’ probability judgments in Experiment 1.
Block Constituent estimates Conjunction estimates
r RMSE MEa r RMSE MEa CE
1 0.62 (0.39) 0.27 (0.09) 0.03 (0.05) 0.41 (0.38) 0.30 (0.09) 0.18 (0.11) 0.49 (0.28)
2 0.79 (0.29) 0.20 (0.09) 0.04 (0.04) 0.62 (0.33) 0.26 (0.11) 0.17 (0.12) 0.50 (0.31)
All values are means with standard deviations in parentheses. Accuracy was measured by the correlation (r), root mean squared error (RMSE), and mean error (ME)
between estimated and objective probabilities as well as the proportions of conjunction errors (CEs).
aA positive value indicates overestimation.
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Therefore, fixing β to 0.80 makes most sense ecologically as well as
empirically.
For each participant we computed the mean of the two proba-
bility estimates for each constituent item and used these to com-
pute model predictions. Note that each item had been presented
twice. We compared the predictive accuracies of the two models
by the RMSD between model predictions and the mean observed
conjunctive probability estimates. As the goal was to investigate
the cognitive processes behind systematic conjunctive probability
estimates, we conducted this model comparison with only those
participants who provided consistent conjunctive probability esti-
mates. More precisely, we analyzed only the data of participants
with statistically significant correlations between the first and
second conjunctive probability estimates within one estimation
phase. Ten participants in Block 1 and seven participants in Block
2 had non-significant correlations (r =−0.35 to 0.43, p> 0.05)
and were therefore excluded from this analysis.
With a mean RMSD of 0.17 (SD= 0.06) in Block 1 and 0.16
(SD= 0.04) in Block 2 the weighted average model had higher
overall predictive accuracy than the multiplicative model (Block
1: M = 0.20, SD= 0.07; Block 2: M = 0.19, SD= 0.09). Fourteen
of 19 participants (74%) in Block 1 and 13 of 21 participants
(62%) in Block 2 were better predicted by the weighted aver-
age model. This difference between the number of people best
described by the weighted average model vs. the multiplicative
model was significant in Block 1, χ2(1)= 4.26, p= 0.039, but not
in Block 2, χ2(1)= 1.19, p= 0.275.
In Figure 1, individual RMSE is plotted against individual r
(between estimated and objective conjunctive probabilities). Black
circles represent participants whose estimates were best predicted
by the weighted average model, white circles represent participants
whose estimates were best predicted by the multiplicative model,
and pluses represent participants who were excluded from the
model-analysis according to the above-mentioned exclusion cri-
terion. Three groups of participants can be identified (especially
clearly in Block 2). The first group performed relatively poorly
on both accuracy dimensions. Incidentally, these participants also
displayed low reliability in their probability estimates and were
subsequently excluded from the model comparison. A second
group performed well on the correlation dimension but poorly
on the deviation dimension. The probability estimates of these
participants were best predicted by the weighted average model.
Block 1
r
M
E
−1 −.8 −.6 −.4 −.2 0 .2 .4 .6 .8 1
−
.
5
0
.
5 CWA
Multiplicative
Inconsistent
Block 2
r
M
E
−1 −.8 −.6 −.4 −.2 0 .2 .4 .6 .8 1
−
.
5
0
.
5 CWA
Multiplicative
Inconsistent
FIGURE 1 | Mean error (ME) plotted against the correlation (r )
between estimated and objective conjunctive probabilities for each
participant and block in Experiment 1. Symbols indicate whether the
participant’s data was best fit by the configural weighted average model
(CWA), best fit by the multiplicative model, or excluded from the
model-analysis.
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The final group performed well on both accuracy dimensions, and
their estimates were best predicted by the multiplicative model.
Notably, although participants whose estimates were best pre-
dicted by the weighted average model systematically overestimated
objective probabilities, their probability estimates correlated just
as strongly with the objective probabilities as the estimates of the
participants who were best described by the multiplicative model.
This matches the previous finding that conjunctive probabilities,
which are based on noisy approximations of objective constituent
probabilities, correlate just as well with the objective probabilities
when they are generated by the weighted average model as when
they are generated by the multiplicative model (Juslin et al., 2009).
In sum, increased accuracy of constituent probabilities, in terms
of both RMSE and r, was accompanied by an increased corre-
lation between estimated and objective conjunctive probabilities
but it was not accompanied by a decreased overestimation of
conjunctive probabilities. Thus, the answer to the question of
whether increased accuracy of constituent probability estimates
leads to increased accuracy of conjunctive probability estimates
depends on which accuracy dimension is evaluated. If the correla-
tion between estimated and objective probabilities is critical, then
the answer is yes. In contrast, if the deviation between estimated
and objective probabilities is critical, then the answer is no.
Although the majority of participants appeared to use a com-
bination rule well captured by the weighted average model, there
was a relatively large subgroup of participants who used a rule
that was better captured by the normative multiplicative model.
The percentage of participants ending up in this latter group was
slightly higher in Block 2 (38%) than in Block 1 (26%). Hence,
although most participants combined constituent probabilities
by a rule that produces systematic overestimation of conjunctive
probabilities, a minority used a rule that does not.
EXPERIMENT 2
Experiment 1 showed that conjunctive probabilities are system-
atically overestimated and that the overestimation is relatively
independent of the accuracy of related constituent probability esti-
mates. Based on the results of a set of previous studies (Nilsson,
2008; Nilsson et al., 2009; Nilsson and Andersson, 2010; Jenny
et al., under review) we suggest that this overestimation is caused
by the way people combine constituent probabilities into conjunc-
tive probabilities. Juslin et al. (2009) suggested that the reason why
people rely on an alternative combination rule, such as the con-
figural weighted average ruled (Eq. 3), is that people often lack
the cognitive resources for executing the normative rule (Eq. 1).
The suggestion by Juslin et al. (2009) is based on the assump-
tion that the configural weighted average rule does not involve
any multiplicative computations. Rather, the rule involves serial
analog fractionation (Anderson, 1981), which in simplified terms,
and adapted to the current context, means taking a large chunk of
the smaller constituent probability and adding it to a small chunk
of the larger constituent probability. Juslin et al. (2009) base their
suggestion on the assumption that fractioning demands less than
multiplication. If so, use of the normative rule might increase
and, consequently, the overestimation of conjunctive probabili-
ties might decrease if the task is made less demanding. Whether
the overestimation of conjunctive probabilities can be reduced
by making the estimation task less demanding was explored in
Experiment 2.
Experiment 2 involved two conditions: the memory-based con-
dition and the online condition. The former condition involved
the estimation task used in Experiment 1, and the latter involved
a less demanding task where participants had access to their
own constituent probability estimates while estimating conjunc-
tive probabilities. Consequently, whereas the participants in the
memory-based condition had to both estimate and combine con-
stituent probabilities in working memory, the participants in the
online condition only had to combine constituent probabilities in
working memory. Did this affect the overestimation of conjunctive
probabilities?
MATERIAL AND METHODS
Participants
Forty-one undergraduate students, 12 male and 29 female
(M age= 23.4 years), from the University of Basel voluntarily took
part in the study. Most participants were psychology students
who had completed at least one course in statistics. Hence,
most participants had at least an elementary understanding
of the basic concepts in statistics. Participants were compen-
sated with either course credit or CHF 10 per half hour plus a
performance-contingent bonus.
Materials
The stimulus material differed from that used in Experiment 1 in
three ways. The number of boxes was reduced to four (the propor-
tions of colored marbles were 0.25, 0.85, 0.65, and 0.40 in the black,
green, blue, and red box, respectively), the marbles were described
as colored or white, and there were two pictures on each box, one
of a colored marble and one of a white marble.
Design and procedure
The experiment was a 2× 3× 2 mixed design with information
condition (online or memory-based, between subjects), level of
experience (low, medium, or high, within-subject), and event type
(constituent or conjunctive, within-subject) as independent vari-
ables. Participants were randomly assigned to either the memory-
based (7 males and 14 females) or the online (5 males and 15
females) condition. To provide participants with three different
levels of experience, the experiment was divided into three blocks.
Each block included an experience phase and an estimation phase.
In the experience phase, focus was directed toward the (color)
box and the participant was told, “Ten marbles will be sampled
from the (color) box; how many do you think will be colored?”
Participants answered by clicking one of 11 buttons labeled 0–10.
Then, a sample of 10 marbles was created by sampling 10 times
from a binominal distribution with n= 1 and p equal to the pro-
portion of colored marbles in the (color) box and presented to the
participants all at once. In contrast to Experiment 1, outcome feed-
back that “you predicted x” and “y colored marbles were sampled”
was provided instantly. The feedback also included a box labeled
“bonus” that turned red if the prediction was wrong and green
if the prediction was correct (participants received CHF 0.20 for
each correct prediction). This predicting and sampling phase was
repeated 10 times. Then participants were asked: “If one marble is
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sampled from the (color) box, what is the probability that it is col-
ored?”Participants responded by typing in a value between 0 and 1
and clicking on a button labeled “assess probability.” Upon click-
ing the button participants were informed that “You responded
(their response), which means that you think that the probability
of sampling a white marble is (1 - their response).” This feedback
was intended to help participants grasp the concept of probability.
For the participants in the online condition, but not for the partic-
ipants in the memory-based condition, their response was written
on the box next to the picture of the colored marble and 1 minus
the response was written next to the picture of the white marble.
These values remained visible until the next time the participants
were asked to assess the probability of sampling a colored marble
from the same box. Then, the new responses replaced the old ones.
Participants proceeded to the estimation phase after going through
these steps once for every box. Thus, participants experienced 100
marbles being sampled from each box and assessed the probability
of sampling a colored marble once for each box.
The experience phase differed from Experiment 1 in several
important ways. First, participants witnessed samples of 10 mar-
bles rather than individual marbles being drawn from the boxes.
Second, more than twice as many marbles were sampled from each
box. Third, constituent probabilities were assessed earlier, in the
experience phase.
The estimation phase included 15 conjunction items of the
same structure as in Experiment 1, which were presented in ran-
domized order. The interface in the estimation phase was the
same as the interface in the experience phase. That is, all par-
ticipants saw pictures of the four boxes. Whereas the previously
estimated constituent probabilities were written on the boxes in
the online condition,nothing was written on the boxes in memory-
based condition. Hence, the difference between the two conditions
was that when assessing the conjunctive probabilities, the partic-
ipants in the online condition, but not the participants in the
memory-based condition, had access to their previously estimated
constituent probabilities. The instructions were essentially the
same as in Experiment 1. In addition to the bonus received in
the experience phase, participants received a bonus of CHF 2− x,
where x equaled the RMSE of the conjunctive probability esti-
mates multiplied by 2. Participants went through three blocks,
each consisting of an experience and an estimation phase.
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
On average, participants predicted the samples of 10 marbles
would contain 3.2, 4.3, 6.1, and 7.9 marbles in the memory-based
condition and 2.9, 4.0, 6.5, and 8.1 marbles in the online condition,
for the black (0.25), red (0.40), blue (0.65), and green (0.85) boxes,
respectively (proportions of colored marbles in parentheses). The
average estimate regarding the constituent probability of sampling
a solid marble was 0.34, 0.44, 0.62, and 0.78 in the memory-based
condition and 0.28, 0.41, 0.65, and 0.83 in the online condition
for the black, red, yellow, and green boxes, respectively. Thus, like
the participants in Experiment 1, the participants in Experiment 2
appeared to be sensitive to the fact that the base rates of solid and
white marbles differed between boxes.
Participants’ probability estimates are summarized in Table 2.
Correlations between estimated and objective probabilities were
computed only for conjunctions because the participants assessed
only four constituent probabilities per block. One participant’s
probability estimate lacked variance as the participant responded
0.25 for all conjunctions and 0.5 for all constituents. This person’s
estimates were therefore excluded from all analyses involving cor-
relations. In the following, the data from the two conditions are
first presented separately and then compared.
The results of the memory-based condition are summa-
rized in the upper half of Table 2. Single-sample t tests,
comparing ME to zero, revealed that while the conjunc-
tive probabilities were systematically overestimated [Block 1:
t (20)= 8.705, p< 0.001; Block 2: t (20)= 7.799, p< 0.001; Block
3: t (20)= 8.184, p< 0.001], the constituent probabilities were
not [Block 1: t (20)= 1.056, p= 0.304; Block 2: t (20)= 1.334,
p= 0.197; Block 3: t (20)= 0.294, p= 0.772]. As can be seen in
Table 2, the accuracy level of the probability estimates, both
constituent and conjunctive, remained relatively constant across
blocks. The only dimension that indicated any increase in accu-
racy across blocks was the correlation between estimated and
objective conjunctive probabilities. However, a one-way repeated
measures ANOVA with r as dependent variable and Block as inde-
pendent variable revealed that this change was non-significant,
F(2, 40)= 1.414, p= 255. Thus, the positive effect that increased
experience had on some of the accuracy measures in Experiment
1 was not found in the memory-based condition of Experiment
2. We suggests that the lack of change in accuracy was due to the
fact that each experience phase in Experiment 2 involved more
than twice as many samples as each experience phase in Experi-
ment 1. That is, we suggest that the learning curve already reached
asymptote in Block 1.
The constituent probability estimates of the online con-
dition resembled those of Experiment 1 and the memory-
based condition. The levels of RMSE and ME were relatively
stable across blocks. Single-sample t tests did not indicate
any significant overestimation in any of the blocks [Block 1:
t (19)= 1.991, p= 0.061; Block 2: t (19)= 0.115, p= 0.910; Block
3: t (19)= 0.393, p= 0.699]. The conjunctive probability estimates
in the online condition differed substantially between individuals.
This was particularly evident in data regarding the conjunction
error, which is illustrated in Figure 2. In Block 1 (upper right
panel), participants clustered into two groups. Some participants
committed many conjunction errors but others committed few. In
Block 3 (lower right panel) even clearer clusters emerged. Of the
20 participants, 8 committed conjunction errors in less than 10%
of all trials and 6 committed conjunction errors in more than 90%.
An additional third cluster of participants committed an interme-
diate number of conjunction errors. No corresponding clusters
emerged in the memory-based condition (left panels in Figure 2).
In the online condition, the correlation between estimated and
objective conjunctive probabilities first increased with experience
from 0.61 to 0.79 but then, surprisingly, decreased again to 0.72
(Table 2). In Block 3, the correlations were bimodally distrib-
uted. The mean r for five participants with poor performance
fell from 0.51 to 0.18 between Blocks 2 and 3, whereas for the
rest of the participants, the mean r increased from 0.89 to 0.91.
That is, although some participants were exhausted by the end
of the experiment (i.e., Block 3), accuracy did increase for most
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Table 2 | Accuracy of participants’ probability judgments in Experiment 2.
Block Constituent estimates Conjunction estimates
RMSE MEa r RMSE MEa CE
MEMORY-BASED CONDITION
1 0.16 (0.17) 0.03 (0.08) 0.32 (0.44) 0.29 (0.11) 0.19 (0.10) 0.59 (0.27)
2 0.14 (0.12) 0.03 (0.07) 0.36 (0.42) 0.31 (0.13) 0.22 (0.13) 0.60 (0.28)
3 0.16 (0.17) 0.01 (0.11) 0.46 (0.47) 0.28 (0.13) 0.20 (0.11) 0.56 (0.30)
ONLINE CONDITION
1 0.09 (0.05) 0.03 (0.04) 0.61 (0.39) 0.19 (0.08) 0.06 (0.11) 0.34 (0.33)
2 0.07 (0.04) 0.01 (0.03) 0.79 (0.23) 0.19 (0.08) 0.09 (0.13) 0.43 (0.36)
3 0.08 (0.07) 0.01 (0.04) 0.72 (0.34) 0.20 (0.10) 0.10 (0.14) 0.45 (0.43)
All values are means with standard deviations in parentheses. Accuracy was measured by the correlation (r), root mean squared error (RMSE), and mean error (ME)
between estimated and objective probabilities as well as the proportion of conjunction errors (CEs).
aA positive value indicates overestimation.
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FIGURE 2 | Distributions of conjunction error rates in Experiment 2.
participants. Notably, four of the five participants with a decreas-
ing r in the last two blocks had an intermediate conjunction
error rate (i.e., they belonged to the middle cluster in the lower
right panel of Figure 2). Given the binominal distribution of r,
we conducted a Friedman test with r as the dependent variable
and block as independent variable (within-subject), which led to
significant results, χ2(2, n= 19)= 7.05, p= 0.030. Thus, experi-
ence seemed to affect r. Bonferroni-corrected post hoc contrasts of
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Wilcoxon signed-ranks tests revealed that the difference between
Blocks 1 and 2 was significant (z = 2.82, p< 0.05), but the differ-
ence between Blocks 1 and 3 (z = 1.97, p> 0.05) and the difference
between Blocks 2 and 3 (z = 1.13, p> 0.05) were not.
The overestimation of the conjunctive probabilities was smaller
than in the memory-based condition. However, single-sample
t tests revealed that the overestimation was significant in all
blocks [Block 1: t (19)= 2.471, p= 0.023; Block 2: t (19)= 3.178,
p= 0.005; Block 3: t (19)= 3.231, p= 0.004]. The ME and the
proportion of conjunction errors both increased across the blocks
in the online condition. That is, according to these two measures,
accuracy decreased across the blocks. This effect was driven heavily
by data from the participants who committed conjunction errors
in more than 90% of the trials in Block 3. A within-subject Fried-
man test with ME as dependent variable and block as independent
variable showed that this decrease in accuracy was not significant,
χ2(2, n= 19)= 3.36, p= 0.186.
As mentioned, the participants in the online condition grouped
into three clusters in Block 3 (Figure 2). Did individuals in any of
these groups produce more random conjunctive probability esti-
mates than participants in the others? To answer this question, the
correlation between the estimates of the conjunctive probabilities
from Blocks 2 and 3 was calculated for each participant as a mea-
sure of reliability. The group that displayed the highest average
reliability consisted of the participants who committed conjunc-
tion errors in more than 90% of the cases (M = 0.92, SD= 0.03,
n= 6). The participants who committed conjunction errors in less
than 10% also displayed good reliability (M = 0.78, SD= 0.32,
n= 7). However, as indicated by the substantially larger standard
deviation, the individual differences were greater in this group
than in the above-90% group. Participants in the last group, who
committed conjunction errors in more than 10% and less than
90% (i.e., the middle cluster in Figure 2), showed extremely low
reliability (M = 0.14, SD= 0.38). Thus, whereas participants who
committed a very small or a very large number of conjunction
errors seem to have determined their conjunctive probability esti-
mates highly systematically, the participants in the middle group
seemingly showed more variance in the way they made their esti-
mates. Notably, it was the participants in this latter group, that
is, the participants committing between 10 and 90% conjunction
errors, who caused the average r to decrease from Block 2 to Block
3 (see Table 2).
The goal of Experiment 2 was to explore whether creating a
cognitively less demanding estimation task would increase the
accuracy of the conjunctive probability estimates. Overall, the
manipulation had a positive effect on all accuracy dimensions.
Across blocks the mean correlation between estimated and objec-
tive probabilities was higher (0.71 vs 0.38) and the mean RMSE
(0.20 vs. 0.29), mean ME (0.08 vs. 0.20), and mean proportion of
conjunction errors (0.41 vs. 0.58) were lower in the online con-
dition than in the memory-based condition. Mann–Whitney tests
revealed that in the online condition the accuracy was signifi-
cantly higher in terms of r (z = 2.48, p= 0.013), RMSE (z = 3.00,
p= 0.003), and ME (z = 2.90, p= 0.004), but not in terms of the
proportion of conjunction errors (z = 1.66, p= 0.097).
As in Experiment 1, the multiplicative model (Eq. 1) and the
weighted average model (Eq. 3 with β= 0.80) were used to predict
individuals’probability estimates. To compare the two models over
the whole experiment, the constituent and conjunctive probabil-
ities were averaged over the three blocks. The weighted average
model had a lower RMSD than the multiplicative model in the
memory-based condition (0.18 vs. 0.25) and an identical RMSD
in the online condition (0.16). The weighted average model pre-
dicted the probability estimates of 18 of 21 participants in the
memory-based condition, better than the multiplicative model. A
χ2 test showed that this difference between the number of partici-
pants best predicted by each model was significant,χ2(1)= 10.71,
p= 0.001. In the online condition, the weighted average model
predicted the probability estimates of 10 of 20 individuals better
than the multiplicative model. One person was predicted equally
well by both models in this condition.
How was the accuracy of conjunctive probability estimates
affected by online access to subjective constituent probabilities?
Overall, participants were aided by having online access to their
own constituent probabilities on all accuracy dimensions. A closer
look at the individual participants indicated that, as in Experiment
1 (see Figure 1), participants clustered into three relatively dis-
tinct groups and that the memory aid affected the participants of
these groups differently. One group of participants seems to have
responded randomly, as indicated by the low reliability in their
probability estimates. These participants did not profit from the
memory aid. A second group of participants could be character-
ized as users of the multiplicative model and a third group as users
of the weighted average model. Both of these latter groups profited
from the memory aid in that they became more consistent in the
way they combined constituent probabilities. For the group best
described by the multiplicative model, this resulted in increased
accuracy in terms of both correlation and deviance between esti-
mated and objective conjunctive probabilities. For the group best
described by the weighted average model, on the other hand, the
increased consistency resulted in increased accuracy only in terms
of correlation between estimated and objective conjunctive prob-
abilities. In this group, the rate of conjunction errors was actually
higher with the memory aid than without.
GENERAL DISCUSSION
Our goal in the present study was to explore how people’s conjunc-
tive probability estimates can be improved and how the cognitive
processes behind such estimates can be described. Experiment
1 demonstrated that more experience with constituent events
leads to more accurate constituent probability estimates, which
are accompanied by higher correlations but not by lower devi-
ations between the estimated and objective conjunctive proba-
bilities. Conjunctive probabilities remain overestimated even at
high levels of experience. By definition, conjunctive probabili-
ties are smaller than their constituent probabilities and thus our
finding that they remain overestimated echoes earlier work that
showed that rare events are overestimated even at high levels of
experience (Barron and Yechiam, 2009). In contrast to experi-
ence, memory aids that reduce cognitive demand can substan-
tially improve conjunctive probability estimates, as we showed in
Experiment 2.
The present study is unique in that conjunctive probability esti-
mates were evaluated not only against the coherence criterion, as
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in almost all previous studies, but also against the correspondence
criterion. As always, the analyses related to the coherence criterion
revealed high, and stable, levels of conjunction errors. The analyses
related to the correspondence criterion revealed two new findings.
First, estimated conjunctive probabilities correlate strongly with
corresponding objective probabilities. That is, people are able to
rank-order conjunctive probabilities in an accurate fashion. Sec-
ond, while constituent probability estimates were well calibrated
(as they tend to be when the full-range response format is used;
Juslin et al., 2000), conjunctive probability estimates were strongly
biased toward overestimation. This is important not least because
it shows that conjunction errors are caused by the overestimation
of conjunctive probabilities.
In both experiments, participants’ behavior differed substan-
tially. A relatively large minority of participants seemed to know
and to prefer the normative product rule (Eq. 1) and followed it
for the conjunctive probability estimates when cognitive load was
low. In contrast, when the cognitive load was high, most of the
participants made their conjunctive probability estimates in a way
that was best predicted by the weighted average model. Follow-
ing this model implies systematic overestimation of conjunctive
probabilities.
Several previous studies have suggested that people overesti-
mate conjunctive probabilities because they combine constituent
probabilities with a weighting and averaging process (Nilsson,
2008; Nilsson et al., 2009; Nilsson and Andersson, 2010). It has
further been suggested that people rely on such a process because it
is adaptive in many environments (Juslin et al., 2009). The present
study also puts some constraints on this weighted average hypoth-
esis. First, people sometimes do follow the multiplicative rule. The
probability that a person will follow the multiplicative rule or a
weighting and averaging rule is apparently a function of the cog-
nitive demands required in the judgment situation to perform the
multiplicative rule. If people cannot apply the multiplicative rule
for some reason, for example, because it requires high cognitive
effort, they will follow a weighting and averaging rule.
Before discussing the implications of our results for research
on the conjunction error, two limitations are acknowledged and
the exact specification of the weighted average model is discussed.
One limitation of our study, particularly of Experiment 1, is that
the reliability of the conjunctive probability estimates was low.
This low reliability was likely caused by participants losing focus
on the relatively tedious task. As far as we can see, there is no rea-
son to believe that the general conclusions would have changed if
the reliability had been higher. On the contrary, there is one find-
ing that strongly suggests that with higher reliability the results
would just have been stronger. Many people relied on a rule that
causes systematic overestimation of conjunctive probabilities, but
others were sometimes able to rely on an unbiased rule. This pic-
ture emerged most clearly in Experiment 2, as shown in the two
extreme clusters in the lower right graph of Figure 2 (online con-
dition, Block 3). The participants in these two clusters had the
most reliable conjunctive estimates in the whole study. We there-
fore conclude that, if anything, higher reliability would have most
likely strengthened our results.
Our results are limited to situations of independent con-
stituent events. However, we see no apparent reason why the
level of dependence between constituent probabilities should
affect the cognitive processes involved in combining them. In
fact, research suggests that the process is independent of the
dependence between constituent probabilities. For example, it has
been repeatedly shown that conjunction errors occur in situations
when constituents are both dependent (e.g., Tversky and Kah-
neman, 1983) and independent (Nilsson and Andersson, 2010).
Furthermore, regardless of whether constituents are dependent or
independent, if participants are asked to assess constituent and
conjunctive probabilities, the rate of conjunction errors is typi-
cally in the vicinity of 0.4–0.6 (Wedell and Moro, 2008; Nilsson
et al., 2009).
One could argue that by fixing β in Eq. 3 to 0.80 we tested a very
specific version of the weighted average model and that versions
with alternative weights may not have described our data equally
well. In contrast, we argue that by specifying the model based on
previous ecological (Juslin et al., 2009) and empirical (Jenny et al.,
under review) analyses we test a model whose specification reduces
model complexity and thus the tendency to overfit.
IMPLICATIONS FOR RESEARCH ON THE CONJUNCTION
ERROR
In their seminal paper, Tversky and Kahneman (1983) suggested
that the conjunction error was caused by usage of the repre-
sentativeness heuristic. The core feature of the representativeness
heuristic is that the probability of outcome x given event y (e.g.,
that a draw from the black box results in the retrieval of a black
marble) is determined by to what extent x resembles Py, the pro-
totypical outcome of event y (Kahneman and Frederick, 2002). A
prediction that follows is that if x =“a draw of a solid marble,”
Py=“solid marble,” and Pz=“solid marble,” then p(sampling a
solid marble from box y)= p(sampling a solid marble from box
z) even if y and z contain difference proportions of solid marbles.
This prediction was not supported in the present study. On the
contrary, the average estimated constituent probabilities clearly
showed that participants were sensitive to the fact that the base
rates of solid and non-solid marbles differed between boxes. This
result suggests that the participants did not rely on the represen-
tativeness heuristic. Consequently, the result also suggests that the
observed conjunction errors were caused by a process other than
the representativeness heuristic. Hence, the present study can be
added to the growing list of studies showing that usage of the rep-
resentativeness heuristic is far from a necessity for the conjunction
error to occur (e.g., Gavanski and Roskos-Ewoldsen, 1991; Nilsson,
2008).
Much research has been devoted to finding ways to make people
avoid committing the conjunction error (e.g., Tversky and Kah-
neman, 1983; Crandall and Greenfield, 1986; Hertwig and Chase,
1998; Juslin et al., 2011). This research has shown that the trick is
not to teach participants about which computations to use (Cran-
dall and Greenfield, 1986), the trick is to simplify the necessary
computations. One-way to do this is to alter the framing of the
task (e.g., Hertwig and Chase, 1998; Juslin et al., 2011). Another
way, as shown by the results of Experiment 2, is to provide aids
that frees cognitive resources.
Two of our findings are particularly important for research on
the conjunction error. First, rather than being caused by random
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error, the conjunction error is the result of a cognitive process
that produces systematic overestimation of conjunctive probabili-
ties. This finding contrasts with a hypothesis recently suggested by
Costello (2009), namely, that people generally rely on the product
rule, Eq. 1, but that noise in the assessment process causes occa-
sional conjunction errors. This account predicts that the level of
conjunction errors should be highest for participants with unre-
liable probability estimates. In contrast, we observed the highest
levels of conjunction errors among participants with the most reli-
able probability estimates (in both Experiment 1 and Experiment
2).
Second, the cognitive process behind subjective conjunctive
probability estimates produces estimates that correlate relatively
strongly with objective probabilities. This finding has serious
implications for at least one prominent explanation of the con-
junction error, an explanation we refer to as the neglect hypoth-
esis (e.g., Wolfe and Reyna, 2010). The neglect hypothesis sug-
gests that the conjunction error occurs because people ignore,
or at least fail to incorporate, information about one of the
constituent events. Interestingly, the strength of the correlation
between subjective and objective probabilities is dependent on
which constituent probabilities that are ignored (for a discus-
sion, see Juslin et al., 2009). The correlation will generally be
much higher if the relatively likely constituent probability is
systematically ignored than if the relatively unlikely constituent
probability is systematically ignored. To see why, imagine that
p(A)= 0.1, p(B)= 0.2, p(C)= 0.8, and that p(D)= 0.9 and that
two participants are asked to judge p(A&C), p(A&D), p(B&C),
and p(B&D) (objective probabilities being 0.08, 0.09, 0.16, and
0.18 for the four conjunctions). Imagine that participant 1
systematically neglects the unlikely constituent probability and
estimates that p(A&C)= 0.8, p(A&D)= 0.9, p(B&C)= 0.8, and
p(B&D)= 0.9. Imagine that participant 2 systematically neglects
the likely constituent probability and estimates that p(A&C)= 0.1,
p(A&D)= 0.1, p(B&C)= 0.2, and p(B&D)= 0.2. From this it is
easy to see that while the estimates of participant 2 will correlate
strongly with the objective probabilities (in this particular case
r = 0.98), the estimates of participants 1 will not (in this partic-
ular case r = 0.17). Hence, for the neglect hypothesis to explain
the high correlations between subjective and objective probabili-
ties observed in this study, it has to assume that our participants
systematically neglected the likely constituent probability. This is
problematic for the neglect hypothesis because, as should be evi-
dent from the example above, if it is equipped with this assumption
it does not predict conjunction errors. Thus, in this respect, our
results provide evidence against the claim that the conjunction
error occurs because people ignore, or at least fail to incorporate,
information about one of the constituent events.
Finally, we would like to relate the findings from the present
paper to the theories recently suggested by Busemeyer et al. (2011)
and Tentori et al. (2013). As the theory suggested by Busemeyer
et al. (2011) is grounded in quantum theory and because the the-
ory suggested by Tentori et al. (2013) is grounded in the theory of
inductive confirmation, both offer qualitatively new and fascinat-
ing approaches for studying the conjunction error. Interestingly,
these two theories share the following prediction: conjunction
errors will only occur in situations where there is a positive
dependence of constituent event A on constituent event B. That
is, if p(A)> p(B) then conjunction errors will only occur when
p(B|A), the probability of B given A, is larger than p(B). In the
present context, this would mean the following. Imagine that A
equals “sampling a black marble from the black box” and B equals
“sampling a blue marble from the blue box.” In this case, posi-
tive dependence would exist if the sampling of a black marble, or
even the conception of such a sampling, increases the perceived
likelihood of sampling a blue marble.
One of the main reasons for adopting the sampling paradigm
was that constituent events are completely independent (which
facilitates the analysis of how the accuracy of constituent proba-
bilities affects the accuracy of conjunctive probabilities). However,
even if p(A) and p(B) are in fact independent, it still might be
that the judgment of p(A) affects the judgment of p(B). To see
this, imagine that a participant is to combine highly likely con-
stituent p(A) and highly unlikely constituent p(B) into p(A&B).
If the participant starts by evaluating constituent event B this
might create a negative mindset that results in a more negative
evaluation of constituent event A (e.g., the participant might
reason: the first marble will certainly have the wrong color, and
with my bad luck it is likely that also the second marble will have
the wrong color). However, if the participant starts by evalu-
ating constituent event A this might create a positive mindset
that results in a more positive evaluation of constituent event
B. If the participant systematically starts by evaluating the more
likely constituent, as suggested by for example Busemeyer et al.
(2011), this might cause a systematic positive dependence of p(A)
on p(B) which in turn could cause conjunction errors. If so,
the level of conjunction errors should only decrease if the per-
ceived dependence is reduced. This latter prediction is consistent
with both the finding that the accuracy of constituent probabil-
ities had little effect on the rate of conjunction errors [because
there is no reason why the exact accuracy of p(A) should affect
the perceived dependence] and the finding that the memory aid
provided in the online condition of Experiment 2 reduced the
rate of conjunction errors [because having p(B) clearly defined
on the screen is likely to reduce the dependence of p(A) on
p(B)]. The question of whether the conjunction errors observed
in the present paper were caused by a perceived dependence
between constituent events is a question of theoretical impor-
tance and, consequently, a question that will be explored in future
research.
To conclude, our results imply that conjunction errors are
caused by the rule people often use for combining constituent
probabilities into conjunctive probabilities. Although the exact
characteristics of this rule have to be explored further (as in Jenny
et al., under review), it appears clear that it is a rule that produces
conjunctive probabilities that correlate strongly with objective
probabilities.
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